Colonel Redford Henry Mulock of Winnipeg, the first Canadian Ace, later the highest ranking Canadian airman of the Great War. Mulock and Sir George Perley nearly convinced the Minister of Militia that an independent Canadian air force should be formed in 1917.
In the later stages of the war, Colonel Redford Henry Mulock helped develop the Handley-Page V1500, the Allies response to Germany’s feared Gotha bombers. The Canadian Air Force finally formed in 1920, becoming the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1924.
Early Life of Redford Mulock
Redford “Red” Henry Mulock, CBE, DSO & Bar born on 11 August 1886 in Winnipeg, Manitoba, to parents William Redford Mulock KC, and Lillian Lucia Cummins, both descendants of Ireland.
William Redford Mulock
Red’s father William Redford Mulock born at Carleton Place, Ontario on 11 January 1850, son of Reverend Canon Mulock of St. George’s Cathedral (Kingston, Ontario) and Martha Catherine Mulock. Educated at Queen’s College at Kingston, Ontario and the University of Toronto. Called to the Ontario Bar and began a law practice at Toronto in 1872. Continued his legal work with the firm of Bain, Blanchard and Mulock at Winnipeg in 1882. Made a Queen’s Counsel in 1890. He died at Winnipeg on 18 January 1930, and buried in St John’s Cemetery.
Electrical Engineer
After graduating from McGill University in Montreal in 1909 with a Bachelor of Science degree, Redford Henry Mulock worked as an electrical engineer. Red’s first service in uniform as a lieutenant in the militia, serving with the 13th Field Battery, Canadian Field Artillery, in which he enlisted in 1911.
Enlistment of Gunner Redford Henry Mulock
On 22 September 1914, Red gave up his commission as an officer and enlisted as Gunner Redford Henry Mulock 40102, 1st Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery in the first contingent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force.
Following training with the Canadian Field Artillery at Valcartier, Quebec, he shipped out for England on 4 October 1914 with the Canadian First Contingent.
Red spent a few months at Salisbury Plain until discharged from the CEF on 13 January 1915, and SoS on Commission to the Royal Naval Air Service, 30 January 1915.
The Royal Naval Air Service
At the age of 28, at a naval wing of the Royal Flying Corps, Red soon qualified as a pilot, earning his pilot’s certificate on 9 March 1915 at the Royal Naval Flying School at Eastchurch, England.
Mulock commissioned once again, as a Flight Sub-Lieutenant in the RNAS.
Canadians in the RNAS
Three avenues to naval air units for Canadians
- by transfer from other forces overseas,
- by travelling to England to join the RNAS ‘from shore,’
- and by joining through the Naval Service of Canada.
In the first category John A Barron of Stratford, Ont. He had joined the Canadian Marine Service as a cadet in 1908 and one of the Naval Service of Canada’s first group of cadets in 1910. In 1912 he received a medical discharge, but managed to accepted as a midshipman in the Royal Navy in 1914. The only Canadian among the midshipmen selected for airship service in 1915. During the Second World War, John Barron served in the RCAF as Chief Ground Instructor at Number 10 EFTS (Elementary Flight Training School) at Mount Hope, Hamilton, Ontario.
Officers only chosen for airships and kite balloons if they had naval background or experience. Consequently all the other Canadians in the RNAS in 1915 went to heavier-than-air squadrons. Three transferred from the CEF: R .H. Mulock, T.D. Hallam of Toronto, and Walter Brogdin Lawson of Barrie, Ont., a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada who by the end of the year taking up an appointment with the seaplane force in Mesopotamia.
At first Flight Sub-Lieutenants R H Mulock of Winnipeg, A.S. Ince of Toronto, and B.C. Tooke, address unknown, the only Canadians in the command. All but the last had already seen service in the command in 1915.
Pioneering Safety Measures
In July 1915, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Red Mulock posted to No. 1 Aeroplane Wing at St. Pol Airfield in Dunkirk. Flying Nieuport type 10 and 11 aircraft, he carried out fighter patrols, bombing missions, photo reconnaissance flights and directed naval gunfire.
Mulock pioneered the use of parachute flares to spot for artillery at night. On 6 September 1915 he became the first Canadian to attack a submarine when he dropped five 20-pound bombs on a U-boat.
Later that month on 28 September 1915, he made a lone bombing raid through cloud and mist to attack zeppelin sheds at Berchem Ste Agathe, near Brussels. A remarkable incident of cross country flying, as he bad to depend almost entirely on Compass and Time.
First Canadian Ace
By the end of 1915, Mulock Mentioned in Dispatches (MID) for gallantry or otherwise commendable service. He had scored his first victory, sending down an enemy aircraft on December 30. In January 1916 he downed two more and by March promoted to Flight Commander and received another MID. On May 21, he scored a double victory and became both the first Canadian ace to destroy Five enemy aircraft, as well as the first RNAS pilot to achieve that distinction.
DSO
For his outstanding performance, in June 1916 Red Mulock awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). Both his skill as a pilot, and his leadership qualities recognized.
Mulock’s No. 3 Squadron equipped with now aging, but agile Sopwith Pup aircraft. Under Red’s command his pilots, half of whom Canadians, claimed 80 successful combats with the loss of nine Pups. Again Mulock earned the praise of his superiors for his knowledge and handling of men and machines.
DSO Citation
Flight Lieutenant (Acting Flight Commander) Redford Henry Mulock, R.N.A.S.
In recognition of his services as a pilot at Dunkirk. This officer has been constantly employed at Dunkirk since July, 1915, and has displayed indefatigable zeal and energy. He has on several occasions engaged hostile aeroplanes and seaplanes, and attacked submarines, and has carried out attacks on enemy air stations, and made long-distance reconnaissances.
Supplement to the London Gazette, 22 June 1916 (29635/6212)
First Attack on London
Flight Sub-Lieutenant R.H. Mulock, from Winnipeg, had been the first Canadian to join an operational squadron of the RNAS. Mulock encountered LZ 38 at the unusually low altitude of 2000 feet on the night of 16-17 May, but after firing one round at her, his Lewis gun jammed.
Two weeks Later LZ 38, commanded by Hauptmann Erich Lennarz, carried out the first attack upon London. The popular repercussions disproportionate to the seven fatalities caused. Panic and indiscriminate rioting broke out; for example, on the morning after the raid, the London police reported that a crowd ‘raided and attacked a Scotch baker’s shop (thinking they were Germans).’ When further and more damaging raids followed in June, with no duplication of Mulock’s interception, the Admiralty sought to relieve itself of its unwanted burden.
On the same night that Mulock made his brief interception of LZ 38 over England, pilots from Dunkirk damaged LZ 39 on its return flight.
1916
During the early months of 1916 Mulock rapidly consolidating his growing reputation as an all-round operational pilot. On 24 January, while carrying out a photo reconnaissance flight to Ostend and Ghistelles, an inland aerodrome to the southeast, he drove down a German biplane to a forced landing.
Two days later, while taking part in an operation in which five monitors bombarded shore batteries near Westende, intercepted a large two-seater biplane heading for the flotilla. Putting his Nieuport Scout under the enemy’s tail, he followed bis opponent through a cloud bank and then sent his quarry plunging to the ground.
Rescue
Within a week Mulock taking a prominent part in another of the command’s duties. Before dawn on 1 February ten Nieuports patrolling a line between Nieuport and Zeebrugge at 10,000 feet, hoping to catch zeppelins returning from the first mass raid of the year. It was they who were caught. With fuel running low after two-and-a-half hours on patrol, the naval pilots discovered, on turning for home, that fog had blotted out land and sea. Only Mulock and one other pilot reached the aerodrome. Mulock then went out with a mechanic in a two-seater Nieuport to help five of the patrol stranded on the sand dunes and guide them home.
With two new wings, No 4 at Petite Synthe and No 5 at Coudekerque, ready for operations in late April, flying duties in the command reallocated. No 1 Wing divided into two squadrons, and assigned the naval support role. For photographic reconnaissance and fire direction, given two-seater Nieuports, with BE2cs for night firing. Its single-seater Nieuport fighters patrolled (together with a Belgian squadron) a sector from Ypres to the sea along the Western Front and out over the fleet. The Canadians remaining with this wing Mulock, Leslie, Hains, and Gooderham.
German aerodromes
The fighters of 1 Wing swept over German aerodromes on 21 May. Mulock destroyed one and perhaps two enemy aircraft off Mariakerke while Gooderbam sighted five of the enemy near Ghistelles – and engaged a sixth off Westende.
The RNAS had begun lo redesignate its units in a fashion similar to that in the RFC. Previously known by letters- ‘A,’ ‘s,’ ‘c’ in I Wing, ‘A’ and ‘e’ in 4 Wing, and ‘A’ and ‘e’ in 5 Wing-squadrons now given numbers from 1 to 8.
By this time some 300 Canadians in the RNAS, 230 of them among its total officer strength of 2764. Most Canadian aeroplane pilots with 3 Wing at Luxeuil, while most seaplane pilots now on home stations. Some experienced Canadians, notably Mulock, who had become a Flight Commander at Dunkirk, beginning to attain more responsible positions.
July 1916
Canadians in the squadron during July included R.F.P. Abbott of Carleton Place, Ont. (WI A 17 Aug. 1917), M. Allan of Saskatoon, Sask . (KI A6 July 1917}, 0 .8. Anderson and L.S. Breadner, both of Ottawa, J.S.T. Fall of Hillbank , BC, J.A. Glen of Enderby, BC, N.D. Hall of Victoria (Pow 3 Sept 1917), G.S. Harrower of Montreal (w1A 23 Sept. 1917), H.S. Kerby and L.L. Lindsay, both of Calgary, F.C. Armstrong (KI A25 March 1918), H.M. lreland, and A.McB. Walton, all of Toronto, and R.H. Mulock of Winnipeg.
Gothas
The Germans had not been seriously hurt by the raids upon the Bruges-Ostend-Zeebrugge naval complex, but certainly they regarded these attacks dangerous. In late September and early October they mounted a strong counter-offensive with aggressive fighter patrols and night-bombing attacks. On the night of 24 September the Gothas raided the Dunkirk depot at St Pol, destroying machine shops, technical records, and 140 aircraft engines.
These concentrated attacks reduced RNAS strength, seriously impaired its operational efficiency, and helped bring 9(N) Squadron back to Dunkirk from the Western Front earlier than had been intended. R H Mulock transferred temporarily from the command of 3(N) to reorganize the supply base; in November he became commander of the Dunkirk Aircraft Depot and Breadner took over command of the squadron.
Photo: Canadian nurses picking up souvenirs from the German Gotha brought down in flames over the Pas de Calais at Mingoval, 1 June 1918. (co 2741)
1917 Appointed C/O No. 3 Naval Sqadron
In 1917 Red appointed Commanding Officer of No. 3 Naval Squadron and the Admiralty loaned the army five squadrons for Royal Flying Corps support on the Western Front at a time when German fighter squadrons ruled the air.
Photo: NieuPort Scouts of I Squadron, RFC, at Bailleul, 27 Dec. 1917. The officer in the foreground is Capt. Guy B Moore of Vancouver, KIA 7 April 1918, a month before his MC gazetted.
A Brave Rescue
In 1917 No. 3 Squadron returned to the Navy, and in September of that year Mulock left the squadron to become Senior Officer of the RNAS Depot at Dunkirk. While there, his bravery in rescuing a man from a blazing ammunition train and searching for others, his action rewarded with another MID and the French government appointed him as a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. For service from 1915-18 the British government awarded a Bar to his DSO for “brilliant leadership and skill and bravery.” On January 1 of 1918 promoted to Wing Commander.
A New Formation
At its peak in December 1917 the command had a strength of 243 pilots, eighty-three of them Canadians. Of the sixty-four pilots killed, interned, or captured between January 1917 and March 1918, twenty-one (30 per cent) Canadians. In 1915 R H Mulock had been the first of his countrymen to arrive at Dunkirk, in 1918, as a wing commander, the senior Canadian officer in the RNAS. By March 1918 two Canadians, Collishaw and Wemp, commanding squadrons and many others Flight commanders.
The New Royal Air Force (RAF)
In 1918, with the joining of the RNAS and the RFC to form the new Royal Air Force, Mulock called upon to form a new Bomber Wing. The objective of his 82nd Wing to attack the industrial heartland of northwest Germany. In July, promoted to Colonel and given charge to establish and train 27 Group, a special force consisting of two wings of the huge four-engine Handley Page VI 500 bomber, designed to strike deep into Germany from bases in the British Midlands.
Spring Offensive
Through the naval squadrons that Canadians made some of their most significant contributions in the spring offensive. Pride of service made the naval authorities anxious for their squadrons ‘to put up a good show with the RFC.’ One outstanding example 3 (Naval), commanded by Squadron Commander R.H. Mulock of Winnipeg and equipped with Sopwith Pups. During the heavy fighting in March and April, one of the few allied squadrons which gave out more punishment than it received. Its success attributable in large measure to Mulock’s ability as a leader and organizer and his extensive knowledge of aeroplanes and engines.
To a greater degree than most squadron commanders Mulock made each of his flight commanders responsible for keeping his flight in fighting trim. His administrative methods directly related to operational requirements because the flight of five or six aircraft remained the tactical air unit, each patrol being carried out by a flight or section of a flight.
High Praise
One naval officer, attached to the RFC in France to monitor the performance of the naval squadrons, reported to his headquarters at Dunkirk that Mulock’s is the best organized and the best run of any Squadron I have seen down here (including RFC Squadrons).’
On his suggestion a study made of Mulock’s methods, and when the squadron returned to the RNAS in June 1917 after four-and-one-half months of service with the RFC, he commended Mulock on its good record: ‘Your men have done invaluable work, overcoming all difficulties, and have maintained Machines, Engines, Guns and Transport in a very high state of efficiency, and it is largely due to their self sacrifice and hard work that the pilots have been able to gain their undoubted supremacy in the air.’
Trenchard, too, expressed his appreciation: The work of Squadron Commander Mulock is worthy of the highest praise; his knowledge of machines and engines and the way in which he handled his officers and men is very largely responsible for the great success and durability of the Squadron.
February 1918
On 1 February 1918, when Naval Three joined 22 (Army) Wing of v Brigade, half of its twelve pilots Canadians, and three more arrived later that month. Besides Mulock the six originals included Flight Sub-Lieutenants R. Collishaw of Nanaimo, BC, P.G. McNeil and A.T. Whealy, both of Toronto, J.P. White of Winnipeg, and Flight Lieutenant H.R. Wambolt of Dartmouth, NS.
Collishaw the most experienced fighter pilot of this group. The three who followed them, Flight Sub-Lieutenants F.C. Armstrong of Toronto, J .S.T. Fall of Hillbank, BC, and Flight Lieutenant J.J. Malone of Regina, all decorated for service with the squadron during the following months. Fall and Armstrong received the DSC and Malone, killed in April, posthumously gazetted a DSO.
Another notable group arrived in March, including Flight Sub-Lieutenant L.S . Breadner of Carleton Place, who succeeded to command of one of the three flights a month later.
Bombing Berlin
The wish to bomb Berlin originated at Cabinet level, and the idea of a strike against the German capital entertained until very close to the end of the war.
The chosen instrument for this purpose, however, not one of Trenchard’s squadrons in France but another unit under his command and based in England. No 27 Group, with headquarters at Bircham Newton near King’s Lynn in Norfolk, had been formed with considerable secrecy at the end of August.
Its commander a Canadian, Colonel R.H. Mulock, whose leadership qualities and organizational skill had long impressed bis superiors. Mulock later stated that ‘we were known as the 27th Group of the Midland area; however, we never took instructions or had anything to do with Midland area, England, but were an Active Service Unit reporting directly to Trenchard, only hidden and camouflaged in various ways in England.’
Handley Page v 1500
No 27 Group to be equipped with the Handley Page v 1500, the British answer to the German giants. In July 1917 both Handley Page and Vickers had been awarded contracts to develop heavy bombers with sufficient range to attack Germany from bases in England. By April 1918 the Handley Page prototype close enough to the testing stage for the Air Staff to begin planning for its operational use.
One of the first decisions taken that these ‘super-bombers’ should raid Germany from an airfield in Norfolk. Mulock’s recollection that an English base decided upon because ‘these machines were so large that they could not be operated from France as the railway clearances were not large enough to take spares over.’ Though this may have been a factor, the reasons offered by the staff purely strategic. Mulock did not take any part in planning until after the middle of July, but Lord Weir’s authority for the Bircbam Newton base given no later than the beginning of that month.
Berlin
This officer therefore gave primacy to Berlin and Hamburg as political targets of the first magnitude and this view that gradually became dominant within the Air Staff. The ‘material’ approach never lost sight of- as late as 17 August Mulock given a staff briefing paper on the obliteration of the Westphalian industrial complex – but the slow development of the v 1500 meant the gradual abandonment of the staff vision of a master weapon striking crippling blows at German industry. Its best use – and that of all other bombers – a weapon of terror. As Colonel Gammell admitted , ‘we are in fact attempting to frighten the German people out of the war.’
82 Wing
As the Air Staff began to wrestle with the problem of the best use of the V 15OOs, Mulock, quite unaware of what in store for him, going about his duties as a lieutenant-colonel on the staff of No S Group at Dunkirk. At the end of May given command of 82 Wing, the group’s bomber force.
Almost at once orders received from the Air Ministry to report for other duties. Brigadier-General Lambe commanding No S group, pressed Vice-Admiral Keyes to block this transfer, because ‘it is essential to retain this officer’s services.’ Mulock, ‘an officer of very high ability,’ wanted to stay with the group and Lambe thought it ‘would be disastrous to move him at this period.’ All that Keyes could get was a Postponement. He warned Lambe probable that Mulock would have to go ‘at an early date’ to a more senior appointment.
Control Surfaces
The Air Ministry had in fact already settled upon Mulock as the commander of the Norfolk striking force, and the Admiralty’s intervention served to confirm the estimate that had been made of him. His appointment deferred only because calamity had befallen the v 1500 programme. In May the prototype had made its first flight. Over the next few weeks further test flights took place during which problems experienced with the control surfaces. Then, in June, the prototype crashed, killing all but one of the six occupants. No duplicate prototype.
First production model
Production of the v1500, which had already begun, continued, but the first production model would not be available for further testing until the autumn. This Mulock could not know. On 18 July Mulock ordered to report to the Air Ministry and plunged immediately into a series of briefing sessions with the operational planning staff, discussions with senior officers such as Sykes and Groves, and visits to General Trenchard in France.
August 1918
By early August he had won acceptance of his organizational plans for the group, including a promotion policy, normal in operational units, that conflicted with headquarters practice. Though the Deputy Chief of Air Staff would have preferred to exert headquarters control over promotions, he thought it best to accept all Mulock’s recommendations, ‘in view of the important political effect of the operations of the British Independent Force. ‘
Nor did Trenchard delay long in imposing his views about the structure and role of the new formation upon the Air Staff. In a forceful letter to Sykes he recommended, in terms that left no room for discussion, that the new group should be an integral part of the Independent Force and that, except for matters of administration (handled by the Air Ministry), Mulock should deal directly with him.
Therefore he had ‘delegated to him [Colonel Mulock] a large amount of responsibility on lines which I have laid down … ‘ Above all , he asserted that ‘this organization is based upon my plan of operations, and operation orders will be issued by me.’ All carried out in accordance with Trenchard’s wishes. On 29 August authority given for the formation of No 27 Group, Independent Force, with two wings, Nos 86 and 87, to be based at Bircham Newton. Mulock now took up his new command.
LCol R H Mulock
Mulock, now a lieutenant-colonel on the Dunkirk headquarters’ staff, given the job of phasing out VII Brigade. Since June No 5 Group’s night bombers had been under the command of Lt-Col R.H. Mulock, the senior Canadian pilot at Dunkirk.
Nos 38 , 214, and 218 Squadrons had been formed into 82 Wing, based at Capelle. Shortly after the wing had been organized the Air Ministry requested Mulock’s services for another appointment, but put off when Keyes stated that ‘it would be disastrous to move him at this period.’ Colonel Redford Henry Mulock finally relinquished command of 82 Wing and ended his long association with Dunkirk on 28 July, when he left to take command of No 27 Group.
No 27 Group, Independent Force
Shuttling between Norfolk and London, Colonel Redford Henry Mulock soon found himself immersed in administrative details. As he wrote his parents, ‘some of my friends have given me a new name, “The Wanderer…it fits my duties and mode of life very well. I wonder what the end will be, as usual I am tackling something so large that at times it seems almost impossible but I never suffered much from a weak heart and we are driving away at it.’
To Lieutenant-Colonel E.B. Gordon, Trenchard’s senior staff officer, more explicit. ‘We are all “full out, up here,” he told him, ‘and are just in the throes of trying to get to the bottom of this Home Administration. After Active Service, it is rather a shock to see what one has to go through with over here in order that we may go out to kill Huns.
Bureaucracy
By judicious use of his direct access to Trenchard, Mulock able to cut through most of the bureaucratic snares laid in his path. Pilots and observers experienced in bombing operations, many of them with distinguished records, obtained from the Independent Force and from General Salmond’s command. Training courses for them, and for the navigators, wireless operators, engineers, and gunners who would make up each crew of six, set in motion.
A meteorological staff assembled at Bircham Newton whose duty to make ‘accurate weather forecasts for a period of sixteen hours from the time machines started, ‘using information, covering a distance of 1,600 miles in a circle from our base.’
Directional wireless equipment
Wireless operators and navigators given special training in the use of the directional wireless equipment being fitted to the vl500. As Mulock later explained: ‘To control the operation of these machines, necessary to have exceptional Wireless equipment and Meteorological forecasts.
The Wireless control accomplished by cutting-in the Wireless Marconi Station at Chelmsford, which had been shut down by order of the Admiralty at the outbreak of the War – [the] Eiffel Tower in Paris and the large Wireless Station at Lyons. The main Wireless control from which code messages sent to the machines, and by taking back bearing on these stations, the machines with their Directional Radio, could locate themselves without giving their positions away. These and a host of other matters taken care of with Colonel Redford Henry Mulock’s usual down-to-earth efficiency.
Issues with the V1500
Colonel Redford Henry Mulock’ s chief concern, however, with the v 1500s and the infinite difficulties being encountered in their development. On this crucial subject he communicated with Trenchard every three or four days, as well as seeing him occasionally in London, and he worked closely with Frederick Handley Page and Brigadier-General J .G. Weir (the Air Minister’s younger brother), who was the RAF’s chief technical officer.
On 28 August the first production v1500 bad left the Handley-Page works and been flown for testing to Martlesham Heath. Problems with the rudder and ailerons, engine placement and radiators plagued the aircraft, so much so that on 20 September Mulock forced to report that the first machine unsatisfactory and would have to undergo extensive changes. Meanwhile the second machine, by this time ready for testing, would be tied up. The best estimate he could get that four vl500s would be ready for service by the end of October.
First Flights
By early October modification and flight testing on the two completed aircraft began to progress more favourably. On the 15th the impatient Trenchard wired: ‘Understand v 1500 been tested last few days. Send full report of trials.’
One of Colonel Redford Henry Mulock’s crack pilots, Major F.T. Digby, a much-decorated British veteran of 216 Squadron, had been flying the new bomber, and Mulock reported that he found it ‘as nice as 0/400 to fly.’
On receiving this favourable news Trenchard posed the big question to Mulock: ‘Urgent your definite views as to whether the vl500 as result of your experience can do the long trip and if so the earliest it can be used. Wire me again when you are going to be at Air Ministry. Important that I talk to you on telephone …’
Mulock’s reply simple: ‘Yes, it is possible under favourable weather, with the figures we have at present.’ In fact, he had already discussed ‘the long trip’ with Sykes and Lord Weir on 15 October.
X
Both ‘were very anxious that a long-distance trip be made at the earliest possible moment on account of the general conditions prevailing both at the Front and internally in Germany.’ When Colonel Redford Henry Mulock told them that two v 1500s would be ready in two weeks, Weir asked that they ‘be put in action at the earliest possible moment,’ instead of being used for training purposes. Mulock had therefore selected crews for the two aircraft and ordered the Meteorological Section to begin making forecasts ‘for the whole area concerned i.e. NORFOLK and ‘x’ and NANCY.’
What was ‘x’? There seems no doubt that it was Berlin. In his letter to Trenchard Mulock argued for a ‘Northern route.’ A map in Mulock’s papers shows the intended track: 240 miles from Bircham Newton to Borkum, thus avoiding an infringement of Dutch territory; an alteration to starboard and a 300-mile flight to Berlin; a last leg of 420 miles to one of the Independent Force fields in the Nancy area.
Armistice
Mulock had only one other question to raise. ‘You have definitely laid down in your original letter to me that no operations are to be carried out except under your instructions,’ he wrote Trenchard. ‘ In view of the above, would you kindly give me the orders required for this emergency operation.’
In his reply Trenchard expressed his full agreement with the steps Mulock had taken, and then gave him a free hand: ‘ I give you freedom to carry out this operation on the lines you propose when you consider you are ready, as you are in a better position to judge for an emergency operation than I am.’
So to Mulock given responsibility for what would have been, politically, the most significant British air operation of the war. But Berlin was not to know the roar of hostile bombers for another generation.
Strategic Bombing Campaign Over
Early on 11 November Mulock received a signal from Trenchard: ‘Hostilities cease today at 11.00. You will not carry out operations without orders from this HQ but preparations are to proceed.’ The strategic bombing campaign over before the machine, which more than any other embodied the hopes of the Air Staff, could be used. Except for a single aircraft which bombed Kabul in early 1919 during the Afghan War, the Handley Page v1500 never to be employed in operations.
Personal Papers
In a short historical account of No 27 Group in his personal papers Mulock stated that because the Air Staff fearful that ‘ we might push off and take a chance’ on bombing Berlin, ‘withdrawn from my Unit and kept in London the last ten days of the war,’ returning to Bircham Newton only on the afternoon of 10 November. ‘They thought it was too big a temptation to leave in the hands of anybody.’
Nonetheless, No 27 Group had a last fling of sorts. On Armistice Day one of the v 1500s flew over London ‘with forty-one on board – ten girls and thirty-one men.’ After the Armistice, Mulock recalled, ‘our Unit was kept on duty and the Germans told that if they hesitated or played any tricks, these long distance bombers would go over and pay a visit 10 Berlin. The Unit kept armed and on duty for about two weeks.’
Strategic Bombing
Given the central place that strategic bombing occupied in the operations of the Second World War, it seems appropriate to consider whether the Canadians who took part in the work of the Independent Force had any influence upon the RCAF prior to 1939. This does not seem to have been the case. Most of the Canadians who survived the bombing campaign went back into civilian life, some, of course, to civil aviation. None who joined the RCAF rose to high rank in that service.
Not even R.H. Mulock, most advantageously placed of all the Canadians to form an assessment of the worth of strategic bombing, seems to have become a convert. He imparted his thoughts on air power to a meeting of the Canadian Club in Winnipeg on 18 September 1919. His remarks made clear his strong belief in the future of military aviation, but in an auxiliary role only. He mentioned bombing only in passing, and then apparently because pressed to do so.
Risk
Mulock did attempt to explain why Canadians should have taken, numerically, so large a part in the war in the air: ‘The men of the air service would take any risk, do anything. And the wonderful thing we found towards the end that, no matter how much our losses – terrific – never any lack of volunteers. And the colonial chaps came forward in greater numbers than anyone else. There is perhaps a reason for that. Perhaps it is due to the freedom in which the colonial chap is brought up.’
Mulock touching on an explanation offered by many Canadians of his time, who thought of themselves as tough, individualistic northerners schooled by a rugged environment and therefore possessing the kind of qualities the air war pre-eminently demanded.
Yet those who flew with the Independent Force scarcely frontiersmen or ‘wild colonial boys.’ Of the eighty-nine whose occupations known, 40 per cent came from the professions or from business and another 31 per cent university students. Most of the students and fifteen of the twenty-seven professionals, like Mulock, engineers. Two-thirds of the 120 men whose place of residence upon enlistment known from urban centres.
Typical Canadian Flyer
In other words, the typical Canadian member of the Independent Force a well-educated, technically-oriented, middle-class city dweller, at a considerable remove from the picture of the airmen held in popular mythology. Yet this conventional background seems to have instilled the quiet courage to endure patiently the numbing cold and unpredictable hazards of black night flights, and the discipline to hold to tight formation when every normal instinct urged otherwise.
Photo: ‘ B’ Flight, 3(N) Squadron, RNAS , photographed at Bertangles in March 1917. The pilots seated in the front row- A.W. Carter of Calgary, second from left, and L.S. Breadner of Ottawa (hatless), second from right – and the ground crew are behind them. At this time the squadron commanded by another Canadian, R.H. Mulock of Winnipeg. (RE 17683)
Founding of the RCAF
Press handling of aviation in 1917 probably reflected a more general public feeling that a great many Canadians serving in the air without having received proper credit, and time given due recognition. Canadian airmen shared such feelings, and so did many in the army. Distinguished pilots like Bishop and Mulock reflecting the views of their country-men in the flying services when they advocated the foundation of a Canadian air force. Their opinions echoed by such highly-placed officers as Sir Arthur Currie and Sir R.E.W. Turner, both nationally-minded and thoroughly conversant with the importance of air support in army operations.
Folly
On 11 August, the militia minister submitted his recommendations (drafted by Gwatkin) to the Prime Minister. It would be ‘folly,’ he thought, to start a Canadian flying corps in Canada, and the questions of cost and the unavailability of groundcrew turned him against overseas squadrons exclusively Canadian.
Instead, he thought that ‘it might be suggested to the War Office that a certain number should be officered exclusively by Canadians, and so far as the exigencies of war permit, employed in conjunction with the Canadian Divisions.’
Sir George Perley
Sir George Perley, however, not prepared to go even this far. In making up his mind he had gone over the question with many knowledgeable people within the air services and outside. His most notable Canadian advisers Lieutenant-General R.E.W. Turner, Chief of the General Staff of OMFC, and Wing Commander R.H. Mulock of the Royal Naval Air Service.
In making his recommendations Perley influenced chiefly by information obtained from Mulock, whom he had been strongly advised to consult. With the co-operation of Commodore Payne at the Admiralty, Mulock came over from Dunkirk in July for interviews with Perley, Turner, and the OMFC staff. Having been instructed by his commanding officer to put nothing in writing, Mulock made no report, but assured Perley that Turnerand Colonel H.F. McDonald knew his mind and his sympathies. ‘Anything I can do in connection with this matter,’ he told Perley, ‘I will consider a favour both to our Country and to alI the Canadians serving both in the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps.’
Mulock’s View
The memorandum, prepared by McDonald, which summarized Mulock’s views reveals his intelligence and his ready grasp of the problems inherent in the formation of a Canadian flying service. His by far the most considered statement yet made on the question, being based on technical knowledge, operational experience, and sound judgment. He began by assuming that ‘it was desired to obtain for the proposed Canadian organization as wide experience of the duties and activities of the Flying Services as possible, with the view to such experience being available for future use in Canada.’
Mulock carefully outlined the composition of the basic flying units, using as his model the organization of the Royal Flying Corps, rather than that of his own service, the RNAS. With force and clarity be emphasized that the key to an understanding of that organization the principle of specialization of function. The distinct tasks of fighting, reconnaissance, photography, artillery co-operation, bombing, close support of ground forces, and balloon observation required distinct units, distinct tactics and training, and specialized aircraft. By these functions squadrons grouped into army and corps wings; a brigade, consisting of two such wings, had ‘in no way fixed Establishments,’ being elastic enough to meet the requirements of any situation.
Eight Squadrons – Full Brigade
If, Mulock argued, his assumption about the desirable nature of a Canadian flying corps correct, then required not the four squadrons which apparently Perley had mentioned to him, but the creation of a full brigade of at least eight squadrons together with air staff, supply and equipment detachments, and kite balloon establishment that together made up the range of functions carried out by an RFC brigade. Such a formation, be thought, should be built up squadron by squadron as opportunity and the exigencies of the service dictated; as the Canadian organization neared wing and brigade strength, senior officers and staff could be prepared for their duties by attachment for experience to comparable RFC formations.
Thus Mulock’s opinions in accord with General Turner’s. One issue, however, to which he attached prime importance, and which had not to this time received serious attention. That was aircraft supply. His view, to influence Perley decisively, reflected his understanding of the crucial interrelationship of technological improvement, operational effectiveness, and political control.
To Sir George Perley the last paragraph of Colonel Redford Henry Mulock’s conclusions and his earlier remarks about political accountability for inferior equipment warning flags and their sober implications determined the advice he furnished to the Prime Minister.
Fate of the CAF
The CAF’s fate now bung on the strength of the case that could be assembled for it. On 3 March Mulock, Gibson, Edwards, and de Dombasle called on Brigadier-General R.M. Groves, the DCAS. An informal conference followed, attended by other senior members of the Air Staff. At the request of the Canadians the Air Staff agreed to prepare a memorandum which could be used by the CAF ‘with a view to pressing for a unified Air Service in Canada.’
Bearing this document, Colonel Redford Henry Mulock left for Canada at the end of April, carrying with him as well the hopes of all associated with the CAF. He had also been furnished with an elaborate document, compiled by de Dombasle, laying out the organization and establishment of the CAF.
This paper followed the main lines of the RAF recommendations, except in proposing a separate air department. The CAF visualized as a cadre organization, making up its full officer complement by secondments from the permanent militia. Other ranks, because of their technical expertise, would have to be kept up to establishment. The total establishment recommended forty-one officers and 468 other ranks.
Though de Dombasle argued that his proposed organization flexible enough to handle both civil and military aspects of aviation, in fact rigid in conception, tied to the concept of a fighter and a bomber squadron, plus a training depot. No estimate of expense included.
Quantity vs Quality
Colonel Redford Henry Mulock had drafted a far less complex organization in two brief pages, providing at once for dispersal of elements to different parts of Canada and for expansion into a larger force should the times so require. But his sketch overshadowed by the bulkier document.
Critical Mission
Colonel Redford Henry Mulock’s mission crucial to the fate of the CAF, because time now short. The Air Ministry had agreed to underwrite the cost of the Canadian organization only until 30 June, and no prospect of an extension.
On 26 May Gibson heard that Colonel Redford Henry Mulock had been before the Cabinet, but that no decision had yet been made. Mewburn, it developed, had come out in favour of bringing home the CAF and making it part of the permanent force for a minimum of two years. On the basis of this favourable sign, Gibson asked whether the squadrons ought to be sent home, and ‘trust to adjustment their status after arrival.’
Mulock, with greater prescience, advised against this course. Most CAF officers agreed with him. If nothing had been settled at home before they left England, they preferred to take up the permanent commissions in the RAF which had been offered to them, rather than risk being left high and dry in Ottawa.
Judgement
On 30 May the Cabinet delivered itself of its judgment on the future of Canadian military aviation: ‘for the present, nothing would be done. It is all off,’ Gwatkin wrote Colonel Redford Henry Mulock; to another he said, ‘this is a great disappointment to me.’
Kemp instructed Gibson to allow those officers who wished to join the RAF to take their discharges in England. He gave some hint of the factors which had influenced the Cabinet when he added that ‘it is hoped that a less elaborate organization and one which would adapt itself to peace conditions in Canada may be worked out. At the same time, however, he expressed to Borden his ‘deepest regret. I am satisfied,’ he told the Prime Minister, ‘that after we have demobilized our air force it will be apparent to members of Council that a great mistake has been made.’
Unfortunately the papers Colonel Redford Henry Mulock had laid before the Cabinet not the sort of ammunition Kemp could use effectively in the changed political atmosphere of peacetime Canada. He told Gibson, who had sent him an agitated protest, that his cable of 30 May had set out the position of the government, with which he was not entirely in sympathy.
Epilogue
In this muted fashion the last institutional link with the great deeds of the Canadian airmen of the Great War severed. A new air force would grow from modest beginnings in the 1920s, and many of the men who had given Canada so large, if so anonymous, a part in the first war in the air would serve it and provide leadership for it.
When the officer in charge of gathering together the records of service of Canadian airmen reported the results of his labours in July 1919, he noted that ‘the identity of many Canadians who served with British flying units lies buried.’ He respectfully suggested that ‘a work of a literary and historical nature which would deal in a broad way with Canada’s airmen and their work in the war’ should be undertaken.
Later Life of Colonel Redford Henry Mulock
Settling Problems
In 1919, due to delays in demobilization after the war, unrest built among airmen anxious to return home. Strikes began happening at aerodromes in England and Colonel Redford Henry Mulock given authority to settle problems. He resolved those difficulties and for that action, together with outstanding wartime service, appointed a Commander of the British Empire (CBE), the only Canadian airman to receive that honour.
Return to Canada
In June 1919, Colonel Redford Henry Mulock returned to his home town of Winnipeg, bringing with him his first wife, Edythe Goodman, whom he married in England. Unfortunately, Edythe died in England in 1923 while she and Red Mulock visiting her parents.
When Colonel Redford Henry Mulock left the air force he become involved in peacetime aircraft industry. Nevertheless, he entered the Royal Canadian Air Force Reserve and rose to the rank of Air Commodore, becoming an Honourary Aide de Camp to two Governors-General. By 1930, Red had joined the new Canadian Airways Limited in Quebec as assistant to the president and worked with founder James A. Richardson to coordinate mail service with a number of small companies.
Red a skilled pilot and successful manager of military and civilian aviation organizations. Colonel Redford Henry Mulock recognized the importance not only of those who flew, but the importance also of ground crew, support and policies that make a system work.
Death of Colonel Redford Henry Mulock
Colonel Redford Henry Mulock died in Montreal on 23 January 1961, survived by his second wife, Marion Blaiklock, whom he married in 1933.
Colonel Redford Henry Mulock inducted as a Member of Canada’s Aviation Hall of Fame on 10 June 2010 at a ceremony held in Vancouver, BC.
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